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Introduction 
Public attitudes toward cannabis are changing. As of September 
2019, sixty-seven percent of Americans favors legalization of cannabis, 
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a considerable shift from just twelve percent in 1969.1 The growth in 
public support has caused an expanding number of jurisdictions to 
reform their cannabis laws: thirty-six states and the District of 
Columbia have legalized cannabis for medical purposes, and seventeen 
states and the District of Columbia have legalized the drug for adult 
recreational purposes.2 Additionally, nine states are projected to be next 
to say yes to some form of cannabis legalization in 2020.3 
Cannabis remains a Schedule I drug under the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA)4—even for medical use—and the cultivation, 
distribution, or possession of cannabis carry hefty prison sentences and 
fines.5 Yet the sheer volume of commercial cannabis activities within 
states that have legalized cannabis6 have far exceeded the federal 
government’s capacity to enforce the CSA, and its struggle has been 
compounded by the growing number of states that support cannabis 
 
1. Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, 
Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 
2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/2 
VF4-UMY2]. 
2. State Medical Marijuana Laws, Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures (May 
17, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/68G4-TETH]. 
3. Keith Speights, 9 States That Could Vote to Legalize Marijuana in 2020, 
Motley Fool (Oct. 6, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/ 
2019/10/06/9-states-that-could-vote-to-legalize-marijuana-in.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/8MHH-DE4E]. 
4. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. I(c)(10) (2018); Drug Scheduling, U.S. Drug 
Enf’t Admin., https://www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling [https://perma.cc/ 
M7PF-J6PM] (last visited May 26, 2021). 
5. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (prohibiting any person “to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with inten to manufgacture, distrihbute, or dispense, a 
controlled substance”); id. § 841(b) (listing penalties for violations of 
§ 841(a)); id. § 802(6) (defining controlled substance to include “schedule 
I” drugs). 
6. The regulated cannabis industry in the United States topped $9.8 billion in 
annual sales in 2018, and is projected to grow to $30 billion by 2024. The 
ArcView Grp., Global Legal Cannabis Markets to Grow 36% in 2019 Despite 
2018 Challenges; To Break $40 Billion by 2024, Cision: PR Newswire 
(June 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ 
new-report-global-legal-cannabis-markets-to-grow-36-in-2019-despite-2018-
challenges-to-break-40-billion-by-2024-300871588.html [https://perma.cc/F 
AC9-5J6V]. The industry directly employed more than 211,000 full-time 
workers in 2018, adding more than 64,000 new jobs during the year. Kevin 
Murphy, Cannabis is Becoming a Huge Job Creator, Forbes (May 20, 
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurphy/2019/05/20/ 
cannabis-is-becoming-a-huge-job-creator/#79212c1049bf [https://perma.cc 
/HG97-93F6]. 
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legalization.7 In April 2019, Attorney General William Barr stated that 
although he would personally favor one uniform federal law against 
cannabis, if there is insufficient consensus to obtain that then the 
Department of Justice would be better off continuing the Obama 
Administration’s hands-off enforcement policy in states that enforce 
their own cannabis laws.8 This is a complete reversal of the former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s pledge of criminal prosecution for 
cannabis use, and may signify the federal government’s resignation that 
it is too late to try to contain consumer demand in the expanding 
number of states that have legalized cannabis.9 
Since 2015, “various bills have been introduced in Congress to 
legalize cannabis at the federal level.”10 By far, the 116th Congress has 
been the most pro-cannabis in history, with an unprecedented number 
of hearings held in 2019 to consider issues caused by the discrepancy 
between federal and state laws on cannabis.11 No fewer than sixty-one 
individual cannabis reform bills were introduced in the first seven 
months of the 116th Congress.12 Given the current political climate with 
respect to solving the federal-state divide over cannabis, it is imperative 
that Congress carefully consider its stance on cannabis as well as 
potential legal implications that may follow from it. The most critical 
question to be answered, as the CEO of the Cannabis Trade Federation 
Neal Levine put it, is “a matter of timing and political calculus about 
what kind of reform is achievable and can help stop many ongoing 
harms of prohibition in the short term.”13 
 
7. David Koch, Dawn Newton & Frank Robinson, The Distribution of Legal 
Cannabis: Impact and Opportunities for Franchising, Int’l Franchise 
Ass’n (May 2019), https://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/ 
DistributionofLegalCannabis.pdf [https://perma.cc/W552-6NVY]. 
8. Nina Godlewski, Attorney General Barr Says He Would Favor Making 
Marijuana Illegal Across the United States, Newsweek (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:32 
PM), https://www.newsweek.com/attorney-general-barr-marijuana-law-13 
92561 [https://perma.cc/3D48-AKZX]. 
9. Rochelle Spandorf, Franchising in the Cannabis Industry Begins to Light 
Up, Law360 (May 2, 2019, 2:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles 
/1154096/franchising-in-the-cannabis-industry-begins-to-light-up [https:// 
perma.cc/8SP9-PYX3]. 
10. Bill Weinberg, The United States of Cannabis, Paper (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.papermag.com/the-united-states-of-cannabis-2631648590.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/7GYH-H69E]. 
11. Tom Angell, This is the Most Marijuana-Friendly Congress in History, 
Forbes (Jul. 31, 2019, 11:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/toman 
gell/2019/07/31/this-is-the-most-marijuana-friendly-congress-in-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/3FQQ-2A8U]. 
12. Id.  
13. Kyle Jaeger, The Debate Over How, Not Whether, Congress Should Legalize 
Marijuana is Heating Up, Marijuana Moment (July 9, 2019), https:// 
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Currently, there are two competing types of policy proposals on 
ending the federal cannabis prohibition.14 One type includes intrastate 
measures, such as the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through 
Entrusting States (STATES) Act15 and the Compassionate Access, 
Research Expansion, and Respect States (CARERS) Act,16 which would 
empower states to enforce their own cannabis laws free from the federal 
government’s interference but leave cannabis as a Schedule I drug under 
the CSA. Such measures would inevitably maintain the status quo of 
balkanized state markets of cannabis.17 The other type includes 
interstate measures such as the Marijuana Opportunity, Reinvestment 
and Expungement (MORE) Act18 and the Marijuana Revenue and 
Regulation Act,19 which would remove cannabis from Schedule I under 
the CSA entirely and allow cannabis trades between states where the 
drug is legal.20 
This Note evaluates the two competing types of reform measures 
for legalizing cannabis at the federal level and proposes that Congress 
should adopt an interstate measure while explicitly authorizing states 
to regulate cannabis within their borders. Part I discusses the current 
legal landscape of the cannabis industry and explains intrastate and 
interstate measures in depth. Part II addresses the history of alcohol 
regulations and applies it to an issue stemming from small businesses’ 
domination in the current cannabis industry. It then asserts that 
interstate measures would more likely resolve the issue than intrastate 
measures would. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence on alcohol regulations and anticipates 
how courts would rule if Congress were to adopt an interstate measure. 
It then proposes that Congress completely disclaim any intent to 





14. Ilya Shapiro & Randal John Meyer, Congress Needs to Settle the Looming 
Cannabis-Regulation Fight, Nat’l Rev. (July 10, 2019, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/congress-must-settle-the-loomin 
g-cannabis-regulation-fight/ [https://perma.cc/WX93-DLKW]. 
15. S. 1028, 116th Cong. (2019). 
16. H.R. 127, 116th Cong. (2019). 
17. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 14. 
18. H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2019). 
19. H.R. 1120, 116th Cong. (2019). 
20. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 14. 
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I. Current Legal Landscape of the Cannabis Industry 
Legal cannabis is the fastest growing industry in the United 
States.21 As of February 2020, the legal cannabis industry employed a 
record-high 243,700 Americans, with a stunning 100% growth sin–
ce 2017. 22 In the year 2019 alone, sales of recreational cannabis in the 
United States rose by 45% to hit $8.9 billion, and sales of medical 
cannabis grew even faster, rising at a rate of 54% to hit $6.2 billion.23 
Nevertheless, despite such rapid growth and money at stake, legal 
obstacles to states’ cannabis liberalization efforts still remain, the most 
pronounced of which is the CSA.24 
A. Discrepancy Between State and Federal Cannabis Laws and        
the Preemption Doctrine 
Under the CSA, cannabis is classified as a Schedule I controlled 
substance,25 a status reserved for the most dangerous class of drugs 
“with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for 
abuse.”26 This status puts cannabis in a category on par with ecstasy, 
heroin, and LSD.27 Those convicted of simple possession of cannabis 
may face one year in prison and a minimum fine of $1,000.28 
Punishments can extend to life in prison and millions of dollars in fine 
for large-volume manufacturers and dealers of the drug.29 
The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause in the 
Constitution. Under that clause, all treaties made by the United States 
and “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance” 
of the Constitution are the “supreme Law of the Land,” notwith–
 
21. See Leafly Jobs Report: Cannabis is the Fastest-Growing American 





23. John Whitefoot, 2019 Global Cannabis Sales Were Stunning, 2020 Looks 
Even Better, Profit Confidential (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.profit 
confidential.com/marijuana/2019-global-cannabis-sales-stunning-2020-look 
s-even-better/ [https://perma.cc/4G4V-52A2]. 
24. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2012)). 
25. 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sched. I(c)(10) (2018). 
26. Drug Scheduling, supra note 4. 
27. 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sched. I(b)(10), (c)(7), (c)(9), (c)(10). 
28. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).  
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standing contrary state laws or constitutions.30 In essence, the doctrine 
provides that if Congress exercises its valid legislative authority, then 
any conflicting state laws are superseded by the federal law.31 Due to 
the preemption doctrine, ever since California first legalized cannabis 
use for medical purposes in 1996,32 there has been tension between 
permissive state regimes and the federal prohibition.33 A detailed 
exploration of whether Congress may or may not preempt states’ 
cannabis liberalization efforts and the corresponding issues of federalism 
exceeds the scope of this Note.34 Instead, it must suffice to simply state 
that the Supreme Court has upheld the federal government’s consti–
tutional authority to enforce the CSA in states that have decriminalized 
or legalized cannabis usage,35 and that the federal statute, accompanied 
by the preemption doctrine, have prevented normalized commercial 
activities for cannabis businesses and consumers within such states.36 
B. Non-Enforcement of the Federal Cannabis Laws 
Despite the federal government’s constitutional power to prohibit 
the cultivation, distribution, or possession of cannabis pursuant to the 
CSA, it “lacks the fiscal and political capital” necessary to enforce the 
 
30. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
31. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (noting that where the 
federal government has enacted a regulation, states may not enact laws that 
conflict or interfere with the federal law). 
32. See John Balzar, Voters Approve Measure to Use Pot as Medicine, L.A. 
Times (Nov. 6, 1996, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-
xpm-1996-11-06-mn-62740-story.html [https://perma.cc/SM8T-GJ82]. 
33. Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and 
Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 Case W. Rsrv. 
L. Rev. 567, 568 (2015). 
34. See generally Brianne J. Gorod, Marijuana Legalization and Horizontal 
Federalism, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 595 (2016) (analyzing recent inter-
state issues that stem from tension between state marijuana laws). 
35. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (holding that the Supremacy 
Clause unambiguously confers the federal government authority “superior 
to that of the States” to regulate intrastate medical cannabis, “however 
legitimate or dire those [medical] necessities may be” (quoting Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1968))); United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (holding that the CSA is not 
subject to implied exception of medical necessity for cannabis). 
36. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, 
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 74, 
90–100 (2015) (addressing legal issues created by the discrepancy between 
the federal and state cannabis laws with respect to banking, taxation, access 
to lawyers, and risks to cannabis patients and consumers). 
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statute aggressively,37 and its ability to enforce the statute is heavily 
dependent on state and local cooperation.38 To put it simply, there are 
about four times as many state and local law enforcement officers within 
the states of Colorado and Washington alone as there are federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration agents around the world.39 Thus, if state 
and local governments were not to cooperate, the federal government 
would be left with a grossly insufficient number of officers to handle the 
enforcement of the CSA.40 
The longstanding history of the federal government’s pushback 
against states’ liberalization efforts of cannabis usage exceeds the scope 
of this Note. While the federal government’s enforcement actions still 
continue, it suffices to say that the growing number of states reforming 
their cannabis laws,41 together with the unprecedented volume of 
commercial cannabis activities42 and decline of prosecution therefor,43 
have effectively incapacitated the federal government’s ability to 
properly enforce the CSA within those states.44 
During the Obama Administration, recognizing the difficulty of 
fully enforcing the federal cannabis prohibition, then-Deputy Attorney 
General James Cole issued a memorandum (Cole Memorandum), 
announcing that the Department of Justice would not prioritize the 
enforcement of the CSA in states with their own robust cannabis 
regulations.45 Early in the Trump Administration, then-Attorney 
 
37. Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 997, 1009 (2012). 
38. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 84 (“Since the CSA’s 
implementation more than forty years ago, nearly all marijuana enforce–
ment in the United States has taken place at the state level. For example, 
of the nearly 900,000 marijuana arrests in 2012, arrests made at the state 
and local level dwarfed those made by federal officials by a ratio of 109 to 
1.”); Mark A.R. Kleiman, Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy 
Waivers: New Options for Federal Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis 
Legalization, 6 J. Drug Pol’y Analysis 1, 1 (2013) (“[M]arijuana remains 
illegal under federal law, but the federal government lacks the capacity to 
fully enforce that law without state and local cooperation.”). 
39. Mark Kleiman, How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization, 
Wash. Monthly (Mar./Apr./May 2014), https://washingtonmonthly. 
com/magazine/marchaprilmay-2014/how-not-to-make-a-hash-out-of-canna 
bis-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/U7B7-ZBJE]. 
40. See id. 
41. Daniller, supra note 1. 
42. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
44. Koch et al., supra note 7. 
45. See Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James M. Cole on Guidance 
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement to All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), 
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General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole Memorandum by issuing a new 
memorandum, which provided in part: “In deciding which marijuana 
activities to prosecute under these laws with the Department’s finite 
resources, prosecutors should follow the well-established principles that 
govern all federal prosecutions.”46 The phrase “these laws” referenced 
the CSA,47 among others, and many viewed the rescission of the Cole 
Memorandum as a declaration of a new “War on Drugs.”48 
In February 2019, however, William Barr replaced Jeff Sessions as 
Attorney General.49 During his confirmation process, Barr responded to 
written questions and pledged that “I do not intend to go after parties 
who have complied with state law in reliance on the Cole Memor–
andum.”50 Further, in April 2019, Barr testified during a Senate 
appropriations subcommittee that he is in favor of a more lenient, 
federalist approach to cannabis laws.51 Barr said he would prefer that 
cannabis be legalized at the federal level rather than just let individual 
states do their own thing in the face of federal prohibition.52 Attorney 
General Barr’s statements with respect to following the Cole Memoran–
dum as well as favoring the federal legalization of cannabis have 
resulted in a corresponding decrease of marijuana-based criminal cases; 
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in his end-of-year report that “[d]rug 




46. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions III on Marijuana 
Enforcement to All U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/EY7C-BNQ8]. 
47. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841 (2018)). 
48. German Lopez, Trump and Sessions’s Quiet Success: Reinvigorating the 
Federal War on Drugs, Vox (Jan. 5, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www. 
vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/5/16851120/trump-sessions-war-on-dr 
ugs [https://perma.cc/FJK8-29VD]. 
49. David Shortell, William Barr Confirmed as Attorney General, CNN (Feb. 
14, 2019, 1:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/william-
barr-senate-confirmation-vote/index.html [https://perma.cc/AWS9-HEE 
B]. 
50. Tom Angell, Trump Attorney General Pick Puts Marijuana Enforcement 




51. Sara Brittany Somerset, Attorney General Barr Favors a More Lenient 
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five percent, although defendants accused of crimes associated with 
marijuana decreased 28 percent.”53 
C. Movement Towards the Federal Legalization of Cannabis: Intrastate 
and Interstate Approaches 
Whether the federal government is willing to forgo criminal 
cannabis prosecutions under the CSA does not alone resolve the 
underlying conflict between state and federal laws and its impact on 
the legal cannabis industry.54 This is because even if cannabis businesses 
and consumers do not get charged with a crime under the CSA, the 
fact that they intentionally violate the federal statute has many indirect 
legal consequences.55 In the meantime, the federal government has not 
yet adopted cannabis legalization in any form,56 and this has resulted 
in “consumer confusion and inconsistent compliance” with the CSA 
regarding cannabis use and distribution.57 
Nevertheless, the reduction in criminal cannabis prosecutions under 
the CSA58 as well as the growing public support for cannabis 
legalization59 have caused scholars and political commentators to make 
bold predictions of impending cannabis legalization on a national level.60 
Their predictions are further bolstered by the unprecedented number of 
 
53. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports on the 
Federal Judiciary 6 (2019).  
54. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 100–13 (explaining the preemption 
conflict). 
55. Id. at 90–100 (explaining negative consequences relating to banking, tax, 
access to legal services, and risks to consumers and patients).  
56. Silvia Irimescu, Marijuana Legalization: How Government Stagnation 
Hinders Legal Evolution and Harms a Nation, 50 Gonz. L. Rev. 241, 243 
(2015). 
57. Id.; see also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 90–100; Denning, supra 
note 33, at 568–69 (noting that the fact that cannabis remains illegal under 
federal law has resulted in legal uncertainty, causing numerous problems for 
cannabis businesses). 
58. Roberts, supra note 53, at 6. 
59. Daniller, supra note 1. 
60. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 113–22; see also Kyle Jaeger, Federal 
Marijuana Prosecutions Are Dropping in Era of Legalization, Chief Justice 
Reports, Marijuana Moment (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.marijuana 
moment.net/federal-marijuana-prosecutions-are-dropping-in-era-of-legaliza 
tion-chief-justice-reports/ [https://perma.cc/EA29-PDQF] (“NORML pol–
itical director Justin Strekal . . . [said] ‘[t]he decrease in federal criminal 
charges is a direct reflection of both the increasing number of states that 
have decriminalized marijuana possession and distribution, as well as the 
evolving nature of federal agents recognizing the futility of maintaining 
prohibition . . . it is time that Congress act to deschedule cannabis . . . .’”). 
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pro-cannabis bills that have been introduced in the 116th Congress.61 
Recently, interest groups have coalesced around two major cannabis 
reform measures to end the federal cannabis prohibition.62 
Under intrastate measures such as the STATES Act63 and the 
CARERS Act,64 Congress would effectively legalize cannabis within 
states where cannabis is legal, but leave cannabis as a Schedule I 
controlled substance at the federal level.65 For instance, the STATES 
Act provides in relevant part that the provisions of the CSA with 
respect to cannabis “shall not apply to any person acting in compliance 
with State law relating to the manufacture, production, possession, 
distribution, dispensation, administration, or delivery of marihuana.”66 
Essentially, even though cannabis would remain a Schedule I drug, 
intrastate measures would make the CSA unenforceable to the extent 
that it conflicts with state cannabis laws.67 Nevertheless, due to the 
continued illegality of cannabis under the CSA, interstate cannabis 
commerce would not be allowed. 
Intrastate measures would encompass what is known as permissive 
federalism, in which the federal government could, for example, allow 
an administrative agency to grant revocable waivers of the CSA’s 
cannabis provisions to the states that meet certain criteria set forth by 
the federal government.68 Examples of permissive federalism in action 
include state welfare policies. For instance, section 1115 of the Social 
Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
waive certain statutory requirements for states to experiment with 
novel welfare policies.69 Intrastate measures would also encompass 
cooperative federalism, which allows the federal government and the 
states to resolve legal issues without their laws being in direct conflict.70 
Under cooperative federalism, Congress would amend the CSA to allow 
 
61. See Angell, supra note 11. 
62. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 14. 
63. See S. 1028, 116th Cong. (2019). 
64. See H.R. 127, 116th Cong. (2019). 
65. Joanna R. Lampe, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45948, The Controlled 
Substance Act (CSA): A Legal Overview for the 117th Congress 
28 (2021). 
66. S. 1028. 
67. Ian A. Stewart & Dean A. Rocco, Federal Cannabis Legalization May be 
Closer Than You Think, Law360 (July 16, 2018), https://www.law360. 
com/articles/1063280/federal-cannabis-legalization-may-be-closer-than-you 
-think [https://perma.cc/HU77-7VNL]. 
68. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 115. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 116. 
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states to opt out of the CSA’s cannabis provisions within their borders, 
so long as they comply with federal guidelines similar to those set out 
in the Cole Memorandum.71 Some examples of cooperative federalism in 
action are the Clean Air Act72 and the Clean Water Act,73 under which 
each state is responsible for its own air and water quality, but if the 
state does not meet certain federal requirements, then the federal 
standards take over.74 
Under interstate measures, such as the MORE Act75 and the 
Marijuana Revenue and Regulation Act,76 Congress would remove 
cannabis from Schedule I of the CSA altogether and allow import and 
export of cannabis between states that legalize cannabis.77 For instance, 
the MORE Act provides in relevant part that cannabis “shall . . . be 
deemed to be a drug or other substance that does not meet the 
requirements for inclusion in any schedule.”78 By decriminalizing 
cannabis at the federal level, interstate measures would closely resemble 
the Twenty-first Amendment, which ended the nationwide prohibition 
of alcohol and allowed the states to adopt and enforce their own alcohol 
regulations.79 
 
71. The eight federal enforcement priorities listed in the Cole Memorandum are: 
(1) “preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;” (2) “preventing 
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, 
and cartels;” (3) “preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it 
is legal under state law in some form to other states;” (4) “preventing state-
authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the 
trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;” (5) “preventing 
violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of 
marijuana;” (6) “preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;” 
(7) “preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant 
public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on 
public lands;” and (8) “preventing marijuana possession or use on federal 
property.” See Cole, supra note 45, at 1–2. 
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2018). 
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2018). 
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1). 
75. H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2019). 
76. H.R. 1120, 116th Cong. (2019). 
77. See Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 14. 
78. H.R. 3884 § 3(a). 
79. See U.S. Const. amend. XXI. 
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II. Lessons from the History of Alcohol Regulations 
Many policy experts argue that federal cannabis prohibition mirrors 
the alcohol-prohibition era.80 They believe that cannabis is following the 
same pattern as alcohol, where the states began with legalizing 
medicinal usage and slowly created their ways to state-based regu–
lations.81 Therefore, analyzing how alcohol regulations have developed 
could shed a great deal of light on Congress’s next move with respect 
to legalizing cannabis. 
A. The Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments 
The Prohibition era came from the Temperance Movement of the 
early nineteenth century.82 Alcohol was seen as a “great evil to be 
eradicated,”83 and one year after thirty-six states ratified it the 
Eighteenth Amendment to prohibit alcohol went into effect on January 
17, 1920.84 But alcohol prohibition actually led to a considerable 
increase in organized crime and alcohol trafficking in neighborhoods.85 
There were twice as many speakeasies than there were saloons prior to 
Prohibition when alcohol was largely unregulated,86 and these speak–
easies sold more potent whiskey than beer and wine.87 In addition, as 
 
80. Hilary Bricken, Marijuana Legalization and Marriage Equality: Similar but 
Different, Harris Bricken: Canna L. Blog (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.cannalawblog.com/a-tale-of-two-movements-marriage-equality-
and-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/P3A4-4BCD]; see also John 
Hudak & Jonathan Rauch, Worry about Bad Marijuana—Not Big 
Marijuana, Ctr. for Effective Pub. Mgmt. at Brookings 7–9 
(2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/big-mari 
juana-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A2R-ZPDY]. 
81. Bricken, supra note 80 (noting that during the prohibition years, states 
allowed alcohol for medical purposes and that those states later opted out 
of the prohibition and allowed alcohol for recreational purposes). 
82. David Crary, 100 Years Later, Prohibition’s Legacy Remains, PBS (Jan. 
12, 2020, 2:34 PM) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/100-years-later-
prohibitions-legacy-remains [https://perma.cc/W48T-EVHV].  
83. Ken Burns, Roots of Prohibition, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/pro 
hibition/roots-of-prohibition/ [https://perma.cc/JJ8R-NWYV] (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2021). 
84. Alexandra Thompson, Note, The Legacy of Granholm v. Heald: 
Questioning the Constitutionality of Facially Neutral Direct-Shipping Laws, 
61 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 309, 316 (2010). 
85. See Crary, supra note 82. 
86. See Mark Thornton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, Cato Institute 
(July 17, 1991) https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-
was-failure [https://perma.cc/P4MB-9TU6].  
87. See id. 
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the country was going through the Great Depression, many states 
wanted to increase their tax revenues by levying high taxes on alcohol.88 
Ultimately, after the failed experiment with alcohol prohibition, 
Congress drafted the Twenty-first Amendment to put an end to it, 
which the states ratified in 1933.89 Section 1 of the Amendment repealed 
the nationwide prohibition of alcohol.90 Section 2 then provided, “The 
transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.”91 By prohibiting interstate shipment of alcohol in violation 
of applicable state laws, the states retained the ability to continue to 
prohibit or regulate alcohol within their borders.92 
B. Alcohol Regulations after the Twenty-first Amendment 
When alcohol prohibition was repealed, regulation of alcohol 
became the domain of the states, allowing them to decide how their 
regulatory systems should be constructed.93 Although the states do 
things differently, the current norm is a so-called three-tier distribution 
system, in which suppliers (the first tier—e.g., brewers, vintners, and 
distillers) are required to sell only to wholesalers (the second tier—e.g., 
distributors and shippers) who, in turn, are required to sell only to 
retailers (the third tier—e.g., liquor stores, restaurants, and bars).94 As 
each tier is required to have a separate, mutually exclusive license from 
the state, the three-tier distribution system prevents vertical inte–
gration among different tiers.95 
Under the three-tier distribution system, larger suppliers tend to 
drive out their smaller counterparts.96 As larger suppliers mass-produce 
alcohol, they can purchase raw materials at a discounted price.97 In ad– 
88. See Mark Thornton & Chetley Weise, The Great Depression Tax Revolts 
Revisited, 15 J. Libertarian Stud. 95, 99–102 (2001); Garrett Peck, For 




89. Thompson, supra note 84, at 316. 
90. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 1. 
91. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. 
92. Thompson, supra note 84, at 317. 
93. Jonathan R. Elsner, An Argument against Regulating Cannabis like Alcohol 
3 (Ohio St. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 482, 2019), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3395308 [https://perma.cc/V32H-XJGZ]. 
94. Thompson, supra note 84, at 311. 
95. Elsner, supra note 93, at 4. 
96. See id. at 4–5. 
97. Id. at 4.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021 
Ending the Federal Cannabis Prohibition 
1336 
dition, due to their superior advertising resources, larger suppliers can 
better attract end consumers to recognize and purchase their brand,98 
and this, in turn, causes upstream demand from wholesalers, which 
gives the larger suppliers substantial leverage.99 Therefore, over time, 
smaller suppliers are forced to exit the market either by acquisition or 
extinction.100 This phenomenon is readily apparent in the current beer 
and wine industries. Anheuser-Busch Inbev and MillerCoors, LLC 
account for approximately 63 percent of the beer market in the United 
States.101 Fewer than 100 wineries have stable national distribution in 
any form, and more than 3000 wineries do not have any wholesaler at 
all.102 
Although imperfect, the three-tier distribution system has proven 
to be effective. There are three main categories of societal benefits that 
the three-tier distribution system brings forth. First, the three-tier 
distribution system offers regulatory benefits. Because each tier is 
responsible for one another in terms of complying with the laws and 
regulations, the three-tier distribution system provides safeguards to 
ensure lawful trade practices and safe handling of alcohol before it 
reaches consumers.103 This transparent regulatory scheme promotes 
consumer confidence as it ensures that only licensed suppliers, whole–
salers, and retailers can produce and sell alcohol.104 Second, the three-
tier distribution system offers public health and safety benefits. As 
actors within each tier must be licensed and accountable for the alcohol 
they sell, this effectively prevents tainted alcohol from entering the 
market.105 In other countries that do not follow the three-tier 
distribution system, including the United Kingdom, tainted alcohol 
from the black market has been a major concern.106 Third, the three-
tier distribution system offers economic benefits. The alcohol industry 





101. See Industry Fast Facts, Nat’l Beer Wholesale Ass’n, https:// 
www.nbwa.org/resources/industry-fast-facts [https://perma.cc/2ZPW-AQ 
8C] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021). 
102. Thompson, supra note 84, at 311. 
103. The Three-Tier System: A Modern View, Nat’l Alcohol Beverage 
Control Ass’n, https://www.nabca.org/three-tier-system-modern-view-0 
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governments.107 Because of the checks and balances within the three-
tier distribution system, the risk of untaxed, even potentially tainted 
alcohol from the black market is substantially lessened.108 
C. Problematic Structure of the Cannabis Industry 
Due to the possibility for both criminal109 and civil110 liabilities, the 
current cannabis industry is dominated by small businesses.111 Large 
corporations have been reluctant to enter the market because they have 
significant assets that could be lost if the federal government were to 
prosecute their commercial cannabis activities.112 On the other hand, 
because small businesses have fewer assets to lose and selling cannabis 
has proven to be extremely profitable,113 they are willing to take greater 
risks.114 Commentators predict that so long as the current conflict 
between federal and state cannabis laws continues, it is unlikely that 
large corporations will move into the cannabis industry.115 
The small-business dominance of the legal cannabis industry 
presents potential risks. Laws and regulations for cannabis rely heavily 
on voluntary compliance with often complex and costly rules.116 The 
rules contain “extensive record-keeping, product accountability, and 
public health and reporting requirements.”117 They are also “very 
dynamic,” so businesses are faced with “constant changes that may or 
may not require capital investment and operational changes.”118 Even 
if intending to fully comply with these rules, barriers exist for small 




109. 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a), 841(b) (2018). 
110. Id. § 844a. 
111. Luke Scheuer, The Worst of Both Worlds: The Wild West of the “Legal” 
Marijuana Industry, 35 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 557, 566 (2015). 
112. Id. 
113. Id.; Whitefoot, supra note 23. 
114. Scheuer, supra note 111, at 566–67. 
115. Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business 
Entity Law, 6 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 511, 530 (2015). 
116. See Lewis Koski, America’s Cannabis Industry: Balancing Strong Regulation 
with Businesses’ Desire for Accountability, Forbes (Sept. 3, 2019, 10:13 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lewiskoski/2019/09/03/americas-canna 
bis-industry-balancing-strong-regulation-with-businesses-desire-for-accounta 
bility/#10bf5c423ed2 [https://perma.cc/75C9-B9KJ] (asserting that busi–
nesses incur costs as a result of compliance with mandated procedures). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
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human capital to obey them.119 In contrast, compliance is much easier 
for large corporations to afford and manage.120 Large corporations are 
generally well-known to state regulators, and thus, it is very difficult 
for them to elude scrutiny.121 Because violation of the rules can severely 
damage a large corporation with so many stakeholders invested, large 
corporations face internal pressure to play by the rules.122 Their broader 
capital bases and bureaucratized structures also offer them a leg up 
over small businesses on maintaining legal expertise and internal 
oversight.123 
One of the most significant issues in the legal cannabis industry is 
that the cannabis being sold in the market today is considerably more 
potent than what was being sold in the 1960s and 1970s.124 For example, 
dispensaries often sell baked goods infused with cannabis, which makes 
its effects much more powerful.125 There are also reports of synthetic 
cannabis strains combined with other chemicals, which have resulted in 
serious side effects.126 Currently, due to the evolution of states’ licensing 
schemes, the bulk of the legal cannabis industry is vertically integrated, 
with businesses owning their own production, distribution, and retail.127 
With potentially thousands of cannabis businesses in each state 
handling their own production, distribution, and retail, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to track what is in their products and what health 
effects they may possess.128 It would certainly be easier for the federal 
government to regulate and hold the right people accountable if there 
were only a few large corporations in the cannabis market instead.129 As 
noted previously, if the federal government were to resolve the conflict 
between federal and state cannabis laws, numerous major investors and 
 
119. Id. 
120. Hudak & Rauch, supra note 80, at 13. 
121. Id. at 12. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. 
124. Scheuer, supra note 111, at 565. 
125. Id.  
126. Id.  
127. Marc Hauser, Envisioning the Future of the Cannabis Interstate Commerce, 
Bloomberg (Sept. 23, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
us-law-week/insight-envisioning-the-future-of-the-cannabis-interstate-com 
merce [https://perma.cc/5T2D-ERHQ]. 
128. Scheuer, supra note 111, at 568. 
129. Id.; Hudak & Rauch, supra note 80, at 2, 12–13. 
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large corporations would eagerly enter into the profitable cannabis 
market.130 
D. The Potential Solution: Interstate Measures 
Adopting interstate measures is likely to resolve the problematic 
structure of the current cannabis industry. Interstate measures would 
remove cannabis from Schedule I of the CSA entirely and allow the 
states to regulate cannabis within their borders, and closely resemble 
the Twenty-first Amendment’s language. Thus, it is predictable that 
such measures would have similar effects on states’ cannabis regulations 
as the Twenty-first Amendment did on their alcohol regulations. In 
particular, assuming that the majority of states will adopt a three-tier 
distribution system for their cannabis regulations as they did for alcohol 
regulations after the Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification,131 it is 
foreseeable that a few large corporations would ultimately dominate the 
national cannabis industry.132 This, in turn, would effectively solve the 
issues stemming from small businesses’ dominance in the current 
cannabis industry. 
On the contrary, adopting intrastate measures is much less likely 
to resolve these issues. Intrastate measures would leave cannabis as a 
Schedule I controlled substance at the federal level, with any interstate 
cannabis trade treated as if it were drug trafficking.133 Thus, their 
overall effect would be simply maintaining the status quo of isolated 
state cannabis markets.134 Given that most states have currently 
adopted vertically integrated distribution system for their cannabis 
regulations135 and that intrastate measures do not bear much resem–
blance to the Twenty-first Amendment, it is less predictable that the 
states would later pursue a three-tier distribution system. Further, even 
assuming they would do so, interstate shipments of cannabis would still 
be strictly prohibited, so larger corporations would have fewer 
 
130. Scheuer, supra note 111, at 566; Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s 
Challenge for Business Entity Law, supra note 115, at 529; see also Allison 
Hall, Brewing Up Buds: Beverages Companies Enter Cannabis Game, 
Spokesman-Rev. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/20 
20/jan/21/brewing-buds-beverages-companies-enter-cannabis-ga/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2ZE4-UYPY] (noting that soft drink companies have expressed 
tentative interest in entering the cannabis market but are hesitant due to 
the unsettled legality of marijuana). 
131. Thompson, supra note 84, at 311; The Three-Tier System: A Modern View, 
supra note 103. 
132. See supra note 96–100 and accompanying text. 
133. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 14. 
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135. Hauser, supra note 127. 
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advantages to dominate the industry against small businesses in 
comparison to what they would have under interstate measures. 
It is important to also note here that many legal scholars have 
proposed and supported intrastate measures such as permissive or 
cooperative federalism for legalizing cannabis at the federal level.136 
They acknowledge that such measures are a more modest federal 
legislative solution than removing cannabis from the CSA entirely, 
which appears not to be on the horizon at this time.137 But they overlook 
the problem of shortage and oversupply of cannabis that intrastate 
measures simply would not be able to cure.  
For instance, a recent study by Illinois state legislators concluded 
that legalizing recreational cannabis in Illinois could increase the overall 
demand for cannabis to as high as 550,000 pounds a year, far exceeding 
the production capacity of the state’s sixteen licensed growers for 
medical use.138 On the other hand, Oregon, which does not limit the 
number of cannabis production licenses, has ended up with a gross 
oversupply of cannabis. The Oregon Liquor Control Commission, which 
licenses producers in that state, recently advised the state legislature of 
a huge excess of supply over recreational demand, a six-and-a-half 
years’ worth of inventory.139  
To be sure, intrastate measures would work well for states that 
wish to legalize cannabis or keep it legal, while protecting the public 
health and safety by moderating its citizens’ cannabis consumption. 
Intrastate measures would accomplish this goal as they would limit 
competition by excluding out-of-state cannabis businesses, thus increa–
sing the price of cannabis. But intrastate measures could leave states 
with an oversupply of cannabis, as is currently the case for Oregon and 
Washington,140 which would decrease the price of cannabis and may 
 
136. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 114–16; Denning, supra note 
33, at 587; Jonathan H. Adler, Marijuana, Federal Power and the States: 
Introduction, 65 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 505, 512 (2015); Susan F. 
Mandiberg, A Hybrid Approach to Marijuana Federalism, 23 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 823, 826, 843 (2019). 
137. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 36, at 122. 
138. Gaurav Dubey & Dean Sangalis, As Illinois Looks Ahead to Cannabis 
Legalization, Lawmakers & Lobbyists Play Politics, Green Mkt. Rep. 
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.greenmarketreport.com/as-illinois-looks-ahead 
-to-cannabis-legalization-lawmakers-lobbyists-play-politics/ [https://perma 
.cc/72M4-XWA8]. 
139. Pete Danko, Oregon’s Cannabis Inventory: 6.5 Years’ Worth, Portland 
Bus. J. (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/port 
land/news/2019/01/31/oregons-cannabis-inventory-6-5-years-worth.html 
[https://perma.cc/4CZS-XCTY]. 
140. Nick Kovacevich, The Giant Cannabis Problem No One Saw Coming, 
Forbes (May 6, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickkov 
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lead to unintended, excessive consumption by citizens as well as drug 
trafficking to other states, which would still be prohibited under the 
CSA. On the other end of the spectrum, by limiting interstate 
competition, intrastate measures could also leave states with a shortage 
of cannabis, as is currently the case for Illinois and Michigan,141 which 
may lead to cannabis patients’ denial of access to affordable cannabis 
products as well as illegal drug trafficking from other states. 
In order to resolve the issue of shortage and oversupply of cannabis, 
Congress should adopt interstate measures of legalization. Under 
interstate measures, by allowing free trade of cannabis between states 
where the drug is legal, there would no longer be an issue of shortage 
and oversupply of cannabis. Nevertheless, there is a potential issue with 
the Dormant Commerce Clause for states that want to legalize cannabis 
or keep it legal, but at the same time wish to limit the influx of out-of-
state cannabis businesses in order to keep the cannabis price high for 
public health and safety concerns. Part III will address this issue. 
III. Lessons from the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence on Alcohol Regulations 
The development of alcohol regulations provides an excellent 
analogy on how Congress should consider adopting an interstate 
cannabis reform, not only because alcohol was the subject of a federal 
ban, but also because the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed the 
ban, contains Section 2 that explicitly allows states to adopt and 
enforce their own alcohol regulations.142 Much of the litigation under 
the Twenty-first Amendment has involved arguments about whether 
Section 2 authorizes state discrimination which otherwise would violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.143 
The Commerce Clause provides that “the Congress shall have 




141. Geoffrey Lawrence, Illinois’ Legal Marijuana Shortage Will Continue Until 
Original Legislation Is Fixed, Reason Found. (Mar. 6, 2020), https:// 
reason.org/commentary/illinois-legal-marijuana-shortage-will-continue-until-
original-legislation-is-fixed/ [https://perma.cc/MX5D-5VF3]; Steve Carmody, 
Shortage of Medical Marijuana Expected to Continue in 2020, Mich. Radio 
(Dec. 25, 2019), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/shortage-medical-mar 
ijuana-expected-continue-2020 [https://perma.cc/LFY8-J94X]. 
142. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. 
143. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 60–
61 (1936); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 137–38 (1939); Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 266, 273 (1984); Granholm v. Heald, 
544 U.S. 460, 471 (2005); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 
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States . . . .”144 Although framed as an affirmative grant of power to 
Congress, the Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause, 
by extension, also prohibits states from enacting laws that discriminate 
against or otherwise unduly burden commerce.145 This implicit principle 
that states may not interfere with the free flow of commerce is known 
as the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Dormant Commerce Clause has 
prevented states from adopting protectionist laws, and thus preserved 
a national market for goods and services.146 
A long and complicated history of the Dormant Commerce Clause147 
exceeds the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note focuses specifically on 
the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence on 
states’ alcohol regulations and proposes how Congress should draft its 
interstate measure to legalize cannabis at the federal level. 
A. Early Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence                       
on Alcohol Regulations 
The Supreme Court struck down many state alcohol regulations 
prior to the Eighteenth Amendment’s ratification, and by the late 
nineteenth century it had held that the Commerce Clause prevents 
states from discriminating against out-of-state citizens and products.148 
As the Temperance Movement was gaining momentum in the late 
nineteenth century, the Dormant Commerce Clause became trouble–
some for states that wanted to go dry. If a state enacted a law to ban 
the production and sale of alcohol within its borders, its citizens could 
simply order shipments of alcohol from other wet states. If the state 
then enacted a law to ban the importation of alcohol, the Court would 
 
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
145. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) 
(“Although the Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of 
power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause 
has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the 
States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.”); see 
also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978); Cooley 
v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 318–19 (1852); Willson v. Black Bird Creek 
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829). 
146. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2459; New Energy Co. 
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988). 
147. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2459 (noting that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause’s roots “go back as far as Gibbons v. Ogden, 
where Chief Justice Marshall found that a version of the [D]ormant 
Commerce Clause argument had ‘great force’” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824))). 
148. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 460 (1886); see also Scott v. Donald, 
165 U.S. 58, 100 (1897); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123, 124 (1880). 
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invalidate the law as unconstitutional.149 In essence, these Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases left the dry states “in a bind,” and it became 
difficult for the states to properly enforce their prohibition laws.150 
Representatives of the dry states and temperance advocates turned 
to Congress, which enacted the Wilson Act151 in 1890. The Act 
subjected all imported alcohol “to the operation and effect of the laws 
of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, 
to the same extent and in the same manner” as though they had been 
produced there.152 The aim of the Act was to allow states to decide 
whether to admit imported alcohol.153 But the Act failed to relieve the 
dry states’ dilemma, as the Supreme Court interpreted the Act 
narrowly and held that it applied only to the resale of imported alcohol 
and did not apply to the direct shipment of alcohol to consumers.154 
In 1913, Congress tried to patch this loophole by enacting the 
Webb-Kenyon Act.155 The Act provided that shipment of alcohol into 
a state for use in any manner “in violation of any law of such State” 
was prohibited.156 The Webb-Kenyon Act’s reference to “any law of 
such State” was much broader than the Wilson Act’s reference to “the 
laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police 
powers.”157 Thus, the Webb-Kenyon Act seemed to grant the states 
plenary authority to prohibit all imported alcohol that did not comply 
with their laws. This suggested that states could potentially enact and 
enforce laws that discriminate against out-of-state citizens and 
products, while being shielded from any Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges. 
As noted in Part II, the national alcohol prohibition under the 
Eighteenth Amendment proved to be a failure, and Congress drafted, 
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and the states ratified in 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment to end the 
prohibition era.158 Section 2 of the Amendment provides that “[t]he 
transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.”159 This language is very similar to the Webb-Kenyon Act’s 
reference to “any law of such State.”160 The Supreme Court’s early cases 
interpreting Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment concluded that 
it granted each state plenary power “to forbid all importations which 
do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes,”161 which 
included laws that discriminated against out-of-state citizens and 
products.162 The Court went as far as to conclude that even the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not impose any barrier to states’ plenary 
power to regulate the importation of alcohol.163 
B. Modern Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence                    
on Alcohol Regulations 
A major shift in the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence on state alcohol regulations took place in the 1980s. The 
Court began to examine whether a state’s alcohol regulations that 
burden interstate commerce serve legitimate state interests, which did 
not include mere economic protectionism.164 Applying this principle, the 
Court has “invalidated state alcohol regulations aimed at giving a 
competitive advantage to in-state” citizens and products.165 In Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,166 the Court struck down a Hawaiian law that 
favored certain in-state alcohol producers against out-of-state pro–
ducers.167 The Court rejected the state’s argument that even if its law 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, it was saved by Section 2 of 
 
158. Thompson, supra note 84, at 316. 
159. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2 (emphasis added). 
160. Pub. L. No. 62-398, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C. 
§ 122 (2018)). 
161. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 
(1936); see also Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138–139 (1939). 
162. See, e.g., Young’s Market, 299 U.S. at 62; Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 
304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control 
Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939). 
163. Young’s Market, 299 U.S. at 77 (“A classification recognized by the Twenty-
first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth.”). 
164. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469 
(2019). 
165. Id. at 2470. 
166. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
167. Id. at 265, 276. 
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the Twenty-first Amendment.168 The Court noted instead that the 
relevant question is “whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first 
Amendment are sufficiently implicated by the [discriminatory] 
exemption . . . to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would 
otherwise be offended,”169 and held that Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment did not save the Hawaii law because it clearly aimed “to 
promote a local industry” rather than “to promote temperance or to 
carry out any other purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment.”170 
The Court’s modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence on 
states’ alcohol regulations has followed in Bacchus’ footsteps, and 
refused to read Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to grant states 
plenary power to regulate alcohol within their borders.171 More recently, 
in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas,172 the Court 
struck down Tennessee’s two-year durational-residency requirement for 
a liquor license as unconstitutional.173 The Court reasoned that under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, if a state law discriminates against out-
of-state economic actors or goods, the law can only be sustained on 
demonstrating that it is narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate state 
objective.174 The Court again rejected the state’s argument that Section 
2 of the Twenty-first Amendment grants states virtually limitless 
authority to regulate intrastate distribution of alcohol, and stated that 
such a broad reading of Section 2 “would lead to absurd results that 
the provision cannot have been meant to produce.”175 Tennessee Wine 
reaffirmed Bacchus’ holding that even though Section 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment grants states certain latitude with respect to 
regulation of alcohol, it does not allow the states to enact protectionist 
laws that discriminate against interstate commerce.176 
 
168. Id. at 274–75. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 276. 
171. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (invalidating a Connecticut 
law that restricted the wholesale price that out-of-state shippers of beer can 
charge in the state); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (invalidating 
Michigan and New York’s discriminatory direct-shipment laws that favored 
in-state wineries over out-of-state competitors). 
172. 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). 
173. Id. at 2456–57.  
174. Id. at 2461. 
175. Id. at 2462. 
176. Id. at 2457; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984) 
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C. Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence on Alcohol 
Regulations to Interstate Cannabis Measures 
Given the Supreme Court’s modern Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence on alcohol, if Congress were to adopt interstate cannabis 
reform measures with similar language to Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the Court will likely rule that the states do not have a 
plenary authority to regulate cannabis within its borders. Specifically, 
states that want to legalize cannabis or keep it legal, but at the same 
time want to limit the influx of out-of-state cannabis businesses in order 
to keep the cannabis price high for public health and safety concerns, 
will be challenged by the Dormant Commerce Clause. Because differ–
ential treatment between in-state and out-of-state citizens or products 
would trigger Dormant Commerce Clause strict scrutiny,177 once a state 
legalizes cannabis, it would be very difficult to restrict the flow of out-
of-state cannabis into the state. 
One possible option that Congress can take to resolve this issue is 
to adopt interstate measures while explicitly granting the states plenary 
power to regulate cannabis within their borders—even by enacting laws 
that may be discriminatory to out-of-state citizens and products. 
Because the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate 
interstate commerce, Congress is free to negate any implication of 
unconstitutionality that may otherwise arise under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause by explicitly allowing states to adopt discriminatory 
laws.178 Congress has done so in other contexts, and the Supreme Court 
has upheld both state laws that discriminate against interstate 
commerce and federal laws that expressly allow those state laws.179 The 
 
177. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that 
discriminatory state regulations are subject to a “virtually per se” rule of 
unconstitutionality). 
178. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2476 
(2019); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434–36; 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 895 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]here can be no dispute that [state laws discriminatory to 
interstate commerce] are constitutionally permitted where Congress itself 
has affirmatively authorized the States to promote local business concerns 
free of Commerce Clause constraints. Neither the Commerce Clause nor the 
Equal Protection Clause bars Congress from enacting or authorizing the 
States to enact legislation to protect industry in one State ‘from disadvan–
tageous competition’ with less stringently regulated businesses in other 
States.” (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 (1981))). 
179. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329 (holding the federal Surface Mining Act 
that allow states to adopt laws discriminatory to out-of-state mine operators 
constitutional); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of 
California, 451 U.S. 648, 669–70 (1981) (holding that with congressional 
approval, states may promote domestic insurers by seeking to deter other 
states from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes). 
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reason why the modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence on 
alcohol regulations rejects the argument that Section 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment supersedes the Commerce Clause is precisely because 
the Court did not find any congressional intent to depart from the 
principle that discrimination against interstate commerce is disfav–
ored.180 Therefore, in order to respect the states that hope to limit the 
influx of out-of-state cannabis businesses to the extent of keeping the 
cannabis price high for public health and safety concerns, Congress, 
when adopting an interstate cannabis reform measure, should make its 
intent abundantly clear that states are free to enact cannabis laws that 
may be discriminatory against interstate commerce. 
Conclusion 
It is indisputable that the time is quickly approaching for Congress 
to address the longstanding conflict between federal and state cannabis 
laws. Each of the two competing policy proposals that are currently on 
Congress’s table has its advantages and disadvantages. Intrastate 
measures, though more modest considering Congress’s reluctance to 
adopt any type of cannabis reform, would not be a permanent solution 
as there would be continuing problems from small businesses’ market 
dominance as well as shortage or oversupply of cannabis. On the other 
hand, interstate measures that would grant the states plenary power to 
regulate cannabis within their borders may effectively resolve most of 
the ongoing issues relating to cannabis while respecting the decisions of 




180. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 482 (2005). 
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